(original emphasis omitted). In the first appeal, this court rejected Brown's Fifth Amendment equal protection challenge to the statutory scheme. As a private institution that receives federal financial assistance, Brown is required to comply with Title IX. Because Dr. Sabor's direct testimony did not address this issue, it was within the district court's discretion to limit cross-examination to the subject matter of the direct examination. Fed.R.Evid. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995), however, courts applying intermediate scrutiny sometimes allowed benign gender classifications on the grounds that they were a reasonable means of compensating women as a class for past discrimination. Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Novack, 3 Treatise on Constitutional Law 18.23, at 277; see Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317, 97 S.Ct. Cohen III, 879 F.Supp. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply. at 5. Therefore, we still have the problem that to fully accommodate the interests of the underrepresented sex may be impossible under the district court's interpretation. Nevertheless, Brown asserts that [w]hile Adarand is a case involving racial classification, its analysis clearly applies to gender classification as well. Id. Section 1681(b) provides yet another reason why the district court's reading of prong three is troublesome and why Brown's reading is a reasonable alternative. In particular, this Policy Interpretation provides a means to assess an institution's compliance with the equal opportunity requirements of the regulation which are set forth at [34 C.F.R. Partially as a consequence of this, participation rates of women are far below those of men.). at 71,419 (Participation in intercollegiate sports has historically been emphasized for men but not women. 9. at 541). Cohen III, 879 F.Supp. Furthermore, the claim that a reduction in the opportunities given to the overrepresented gender is an unacceptable method of coming into compliance with the three prong test is contrary to both Cohen II and comments of the majority opinion. at ----, 116 S.Ct. 1287, 1288-89, 28 L.Ed.2d 582 (1971) (recognizing that measures required to remedy race discrimination will almost invariably require race-conscious classifications, and that [a]ny other approach would freeze the status quo that is the very target of all desegregation processes). Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 906; Villanueva, 930 F.2d at 129. There is simply no other way to assess participation rates, interest levels, and abilities. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995) ( Adarand), controls this case necessarily presumes that Adarand constitutes a contrary intervening decision by controlling authority on point that (i) undermines the validity of Cohen II; (ii) compels us to depart from the law of the case doctrine; and (iii) therefore mandates that we reexamine Brown's equal protection claim. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 907 (1st Cir.1993) ("Cohen II "). at 2288 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (collecting cases).22. This approach is entirely contrary to Congress's unmistakably clear mandate that educational institutions not use federal monies to perpetuate gender-based discrimination, id. at 3008, in upholding against a Fifth Amendment equal protection challenge a benign race-based affirmative action program that was adopted by an agency at the explicit direction of Congress. The Court in Adarand singled out Metro Broadcasting as a significant departure from much of the Equal Protection jurisprudence that had come before it, in part because it suggested that benign government race-conscious classifications should be treated less skeptically than others. We cannot pretend that an interpretation of a statute that contains explicit categorization according to gender and that has intentional gender-conscious effect does not represent gender-based government action. The Cohen II court stated that it was adopting a deferential standard of review, and that if the district court made no clear error of law or fact, we will overturn its calibration only for manifest abuse of discretion. Id. Case: Cohen v. Brown University 1:92-cv-00197 | U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island. See 44 Fed.Reg. 6. At issue in this appeal is the proper interpretation of the first of these, the so-called three-part test,7 which inquires as follows: (1)Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female students are provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments; or, (2)Where the members of one sex have been and are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can show a history and continuing practice of program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and abilities of the members of that sex; or. at 214; see also Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 898 n. 15 (noting that a school may achieve compliance with Title IX by reducing opportunities for the overrepresented gender). Id. In so doing, we upheld the district court's analysis and ruled that an institution violates Title IX if it ineffectively accommodates its students' interests and abilities in athletics under 34 C.F.R. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583, and Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 109 S.Ct. at 25; (iii) other programs indicative of interests and abilities, such as club and intramural sports, sports programs at feeder schools, community and regional sports programs, and physical education classes, id.As the district court noted, however, the agency characterizes surveys as a simple way to identify which additional sports might appropriately be created to achieve compliance Thus, a survey of interests would follow a determination that an institution does not satisfy prong three; it would not be utilized to make that determination in the first instance. Cohen III, 879 F.Supp. at 71,413 n. 1. Ryan v. Royal Ins. at 212, is clearly correct. Mora v. J&M Plating, Inc., 2022 IL App (2d) 210692, 2022 WL 17335861 (2022). The district court noted that there may be other women's club sports with sufficient interest and ability to warrant elevation to varsity status, but that plaintiffs did not introduce at trial substantial evidence demonstrating the existence of other women's club teams meeting the criteria. In addition, a gender-conscious remedial scheme is constitutionally permissible if it directly protects the interests of the disproportionately burdened gender. The email address cannot be subscribed. App. Applying these principles, Cohen II held that the applicable regulation, 34 C.F.R. 938, 130 L.Ed.2d 883 (1995); Favia v. Indiana Univ. When an appeal comes to us in that posture, the appellate court's conclusions as to the merits of the issues presented on preliminary injunction are to be understood as statements of probable outcomes, rather than as comprising the ultimate law of the case. A.M. Capen's Co. v. American Trading and Prod. 1 " Specifically, the plaintiff class, which consists of all present and future Brown University women students and . The district court also summarized the history of athletics at Brown, finding, inter alia, that, while nearly all of the men's varsity teams were established before 1927, virtually all of the women's varsity teams were created between 1971 and 1977, after Brown's merger with Pembroke College. Finding that Brown's proposed compliance plan was not comprehensive and that it failed to comply with the opinion and order of Cohen III, the district court rejected the plan and ordered in its place specific relief consistent with Brown's stated objectives in formulating the plan. See Grivois v. Brown, 6 Vet. Brown violated Title IX in 2020 when it eliminated 11 sports for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24, and n. 9, 102 S.Ct. Finally, the third prong, interpreted as the majority advocates, dispenses with statistical balancing only because it choose to accord zero weight to one side of the balance. 1044, 134 L.Ed.2d 191 (1996). at 1848. Accordingly, even assuming that the three-part test creates a gender classification that favors women, allowing consideration of gender in determining the remedy for a Title IX violation serves the important objective of ensur[ing] that in instances where overall athletic opportunities decrease, the actual opportunities available to the underrepresented gender do not. Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272. Under the three-part test, the institution may also excuse the disparity under prong two, by showing a history and continuing practice of program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and abilities of the [underrepresented gender], 44 Fed.Reg. The doctrine requires a trial court on remand to dispose of the case in accordance with the appellate court's mandate by implementing both the letter and the spirit of the mandate, taking into account the appellate court's opinion and the circumstances it embraces, United States v. Connell, 6 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Kikumura, 947 F.2d 72, 76 (3d Cir.1991)), and binds newly constituted panels to prior panel decisions on point, e.g., Irving v. United States, 49 F.3d 830, 833-34 (1st Cir.1995); Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth., 991 F.2d 935, 939 n. 3 (1st Cir.1993). Co., 41 F.3d 764, 769 (1st. at 2112. at 12. Applying 1681(b), the prior panel held that Title IX does not mandate strict numerical equality between the gender balance of a college's athletic program and the gender balance of its student body. Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 894. As Brown rightly argues, the district court's application of the three-prong test requires Brown to allocate its athletic resources to meet the as-yet-unmet interest of a member of the underrepresented sex, women in this case, while simultaneously neglecting any unmet interest among individuals of the overrepresented sex. After all, the district court itself stated that one of the compliance options available to Brown under Title IX is to demote or eliminate the requisite number of men's positions. Cohen III, 879 F.Supp. 1764, 1769-70, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973). Cohen v. Brown University. The Seventh Circuit did not consider the question of whether, had the defendant University of Illinois not been in compliance, lack of compliance with the three-prong test alone would trigger automatic liability, nor did the Seventh Circuit spell out what steps would have been required of defendant. of Cal. We therefore affirm in all respects the district court's analysis and rulings on the issue of liability. U.S. District Court Chief Judge John McConnell, Jr. approved a stipulated order on Tuesday in Cohen v. Brown University, the landmark Title IX case, requiring Brown University to pay $1,135,000 . If so, the inquiry ends and Brown should be judged to be in compliance. At the time of Cohen v. Brown University, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir.1993) (Cohen II), the standard intermediate scrutiny test for discriminatory classifications based on sex required that a statutory classification must be substantially related to an important government objective. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108 S.Ct. As the Seventh Circuit observed, Congress itself recognized that addressing discrimination in athletics presented a unique set of problems not raised in areas such as employment and academics. Kelley, 35 F.3d at 270 (citing Sex Discrimination Regulations, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Post Secondary Education of the Committee on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 U.S.C. Villanueva v. Wellesley College, 930 F.2d 124, 129 (1st Cir.1991) (citations omitted). The district court found that Brown predetermines the approximate number of varsity positions available to men and women, and, thus, that the concept of any measure of unfilled but available athletic slots does not comport with reality. Cohen III, 879 F.Supp. at II-2. Second, the standard of review has changed. While the Virginia Court made liberal use of the phrase exceedingly persuasive justification, and sparse use of the formulation substantially related to an important governmental objective, the Court nevertheless struck down the gender-based admissions policy at issue in that case under intermediate scrutiny, 518 U.S. at ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. Where such a disparity has been established, the inquiry under prong three is whether the athletics interests and abilities of the underrepresented gender are fully and effectively accommodated, such that the institution may be found to comply with Title IX, notwithstanding the disparity.23. Athletics are part of that curriculum. That notwithstanding, where-as here-the resulting regulation is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, we owe no such deference to the interpretation chosen where the choice is made not by the agency but by the district court. 185, 214 (D.R.I.1995) ( Cohen III). A university does not treat its men's and women's teams equally if it allows the coaches of men's teams to set their own maximum capacity limits but overrides the judgment of coaches of women's teams on the same matter. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 845, 848-49, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984) (instructing appellate courts to ignore errors that do not affect the essential fairness of the trial). 118 Cong.Rec. The prior panel considered and rejected Brown's approach, observing that Brown reads the full out of the duty to accommodate fully and effectively. Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 899. I fail to see how these statements can be reconciled with the claim that Brown cannot satisfy prong two by reducing the number of participation opportunities for men. Regardless of how many steps are involved, the fact remains that the test requires proportionate participation opportunities for both sexes (prong one) unless one sex is simply not interested in participating (prong three). While they point to Congress' decision to delegate authority to the relevant agencies, this does not amount to a genuine-that is, not hypothesized or invented in view of litigation, id. Sch. The fact of gender-conscious classification, even with equal enforcement with respect to both genders, requires the application of a higher level of scrutiny than rational basis review. The panel explained that, while evidence of a gender-based disparity in an institution's athletics program is relevant to a determination of noncompliance, a court assessing Title IX compliance may not find a violation solely because there is a disparity between the gender composition of an educational institution's student constituency, on the one hand, and its athletic programs, on the other hand. Id. The plaintiff class comprises all present, future, and potential Brown University women students who participate, seek to participate, and/or are deterred from participating in intercollegiate athletics funded by Brown. Appellees argue that this claim is waived because Brown did not raise it in the district court. Subsection (b) also provides, however, that it shall not be construed to prevent the consideration in any proceeding under this chapter of statistical evidence tending to show that such an imbalance exists with respect to the participation in, or receipt of the benefits of, any such program or activity by the members of one sex. Id. 98 S.Ct way to assess participation rates of women are far below those of men. ) no way. ; Villanueva, 930 F.2d at 906 ; Villanueva, 930 F.2d 906... Quot ; ) a private institution that receives federal financial assistance, is... Way to assess participation rates, interest levels, and Croson, 488 U.S.,!, 930 F.2d 124, 129 ( 1st Cir.1991 ) ( Cohen III ) id. Of this, participation rates of women are far below those of men. ) Specifically, the class! 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(original emphasis omitted). In the first appeal, this court rejected Brown's Fifth Amendment equal protection challenge to the statutory scheme. As a private institution that receives federal financial assistance, Brown is required to comply with Title IX. Because Dr. Sabor's direct testimony did not address this issue, it was within the district court's discretion to limit cross-examination to the subject matter of the direct examination. Fed.R.Evid. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995), however, courts applying intermediate scrutiny sometimes allowed benign gender classifications on the grounds that they were a reasonable means of compensating women as a class for past discrimination. Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Novack, 3 Treatise on Constitutional Law 18.23, at 277; see Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317, 97 S.Ct. Cohen III, 879 F.Supp. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply. at 5. Therefore, we still have the problem that to fully accommodate the interests of the underrepresented sex may be impossible under the district court's interpretation. Nevertheless, Brown asserts that [w]hile Adarand is a case involving racial classification, its analysis clearly applies to gender classification as well. Id. Section 1681(b) provides yet another reason why the district court's reading of prong three is troublesome and why Brown's reading is a reasonable alternative. In particular, this Policy Interpretation provides a means to assess an institution's compliance with the equal opportunity requirements of the regulation which are set forth at [34 C.F.R. Partially as a consequence of this, participation rates of women are far below those of men.). at 71,419 (Participation in intercollegiate sports has historically been emphasized for men but not women. 9. at 541). Cohen III, 879 F.Supp. Furthermore, the claim that a reduction in the opportunities given to the overrepresented gender is an unacceptable method of coming into compliance with the three prong test is contrary to both Cohen II and comments of the majority opinion. at ----, 116 S.Ct. 1287, 1288-89, 28 L.Ed.2d 582 (1971) (recognizing that measures required to remedy race discrimination will almost invariably require race-conscious classifications, and that [a]ny other approach would freeze the status quo that is the very target of all desegregation processes). Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 906; Villanueva, 930 F.2d at 129. There is simply no other way to assess participation rates, interest levels, and abilities. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995) ( Adarand), controls this case necessarily presumes that Adarand constitutes a contrary intervening decision by controlling authority on point that (i) undermines the validity of Cohen II; (ii) compels us to depart from the law of the case doctrine; and (iii) therefore mandates that we reexamine Brown's equal protection claim. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 907 (1st Cir.1993) ("Cohen II "). at 2288 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (collecting cases).22. This approach is entirely contrary to Congress's unmistakably clear mandate that educational institutions not use federal monies to perpetuate gender-based discrimination, id. at 3008, in upholding against a Fifth Amendment equal protection challenge a benign race-based affirmative action program that was adopted by an agency at the explicit direction of Congress. The Court in Adarand singled out Metro Broadcasting as a significant departure from much of the Equal Protection jurisprudence that had come before it, in part because it suggested that benign government race-conscious classifications should be treated less skeptically than others. We cannot pretend that an interpretation of a statute that contains explicit categorization according to gender and that has intentional gender-conscious effect does not represent gender-based government action. The Cohen II court stated that it was adopting a deferential standard of review, and that if the district court made no clear error of law or fact, we will overturn its calibration only for manifest abuse of discretion. Id. Case: Cohen v. Brown University 1:92-cv-00197 | U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island. See 44 Fed.Reg. 6. At issue in this appeal is the proper interpretation of the first of these, the so-called three-part test,7 which inquires as follows: (1)Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female students are provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments; or, (2)Where the members of one sex have been and are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can show a history and continuing practice of program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and abilities of the members of that sex; or. at 214; see also Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 898 n. 15 (noting that a school may achieve compliance with Title IX by reducing opportunities for the overrepresented gender). Id. In so doing, we upheld the district court's analysis and ruled that an institution violates Title IX if it ineffectively accommodates its students' interests and abilities in athletics under 34 C.F.R. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583, and Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 109 S.Ct. at 25; (iii) other programs indicative of interests and abilities, such as club and intramural sports, sports programs at feeder schools, community and regional sports programs, and physical education classes, id.As the district court noted, however, the agency characterizes surveys as a simple way to identify which additional sports might appropriately be created to achieve compliance Thus, a survey of interests would follow a determination that an institution does not satisfy prong three; it would not be utilized to make that determination in the first instance. Cohen III, 879 F.Supp. at 71,413 n. 1. Ryan v. Royal Ins. at 212, is clearly correct. Mora v. J&M Plating, Inc., 2022 IL App (2d) 210692, 2022 WL 17335861 (2022). The district court noted that there may be other women's club sports with sufficient interest and ability to warrant elevation to varsity status, but that plaintiffs did not introduce at trial substantial evidence demonstrating the existence of other women's club teams meeting the criteria. In addition, a gender-conscious remedial scheme is constitutionally permissible if it directly protects the interests of the disproportionately burdened gender. The email address cannot be subscribed. App. Applying these principles, Cohen II held that the applicable regulation, 34 C.F.R. 938, 130 L.Ed.2d 883 (1995); Favia v. Indiana Univ. When an appeal comes to us in that posture, the appellate court's conclusions as to the merits of the issues presented on preliminary injunction are to be understood as statements of probable outcomes, rather than as comprising the ultimate law of the case. A.M. Capen's Co. v. American Trading and Prod. 1 " Specifically, the plaintiff class, which consists of all present and future Brown University women students and . The district court also summarized the history of athletics at Brown, finding, inter alia, that, while nearly all of the men's varsity teams were established before 1927, virtually all of the women's varsity teams were created between 1971 and 1977, after Brown's merger with Pembroke College. Finding that Brown's proposed compliance plan was not comprehensive and that it failed to comply with the opinion and order of Cohen III, the district court rejected the plan and ordered in its place specific relief consistent with Brown's stated objectives in formulating the plan. See Grivois v. Brown, 6 Vet. Brown violated Title IX in 2020 when it eliminated 11 sports for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24, and n. 9, 102 S.Ct. Finally, the third prong, interpreted as the majority advocates, dispenses with statistical balancing only because it choose to accord zero weight to one side of the balance. 1044, 134 L.Ed.2d 191 (1996). at 1848. Accordingly, even assuming that the three-part test creates a gender classification that favors women, allowing consideration of gender in determining the remedy for a Title IX violation serves the important objective of ensur[ing] that in instances where overall athletic opportunities decrease, the actual opportunities available to the underrepresented gender do not. Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272. Under the three-part test, the institution may also excuse the disparity under prong two, by showing a history and continuing practice of program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and abilities of the [underrepresented gender], 44 Fed.Reg. The doctrine requires a trial court on remand to dispose of the case in accordance with the appellate court's mandate by implementing both the letter and the spirit of the mandate, taking into account the appellate court's opinion and the circumstances it embraces, United States v. Connell, 6 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Kikumura, 947 F.2d 72, 76 (3d Cir.1991)), and binds newly constituted panels to prior panel decisions on point, e.g., Irving v. United States, 49 F.3d 830, 833-34 (1st Cir.1995); Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth., 991 F.2d 935, 939 n. 3 (1st Cir.1993). Co., 41 F.3d 764, 769 (1st. at 2112. at 12. Applying 1681(b), the prior panel held that Title IX does not mandate strict numerical equality between the gender balance of a college's athletic program and the gender balance of its student body. Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 894. As Brown rightly argues, the district court's application of the three-prong test requires Brown to allocate its athletic resources to meet the as-yet-unmet interest of a member of the underrepresented sex, women in this case, while simultaneously neglecting any unmet interest among individuals of the overrepresented sex. After all, the district court itself stated that one of the compliance options available to Brown under Title IX is to demote or eliminate the requisite number of men's positions. Cohen III, 879 F.Supp. 1764, 1769-70, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973). Cohen v. Brown University. The Seventh Circuit did not consider the question of whether, had the defendant University of Illinois not been in compliance, lack of compliance with the three-prong test alone would trigger automatic liability, nor did the Seventh Circuit spell out what steps would have been required of defendant. of Cal. We therefore affirm in all respects the district court's analysis and rulings on the issue of liability. U.S. District Court Chief Judge John McConnell, Jr. approved a stipulated order on Tuesday in Cohen v. Brown University, the landmark Title IX case, requiring Brown University to pay $1,135,000 . If so, the inquiry ends and Brown should be judged to be in compliance. At the time of Cohen v. Brown University, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir.1993) (Cohen II), the standard intermediate scrutiny test for discriminatory classifications based on sex required that a statutory classification must be substantially related to an important government objective. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108 S.Ct. As the Seventh Circuit observed, Congress itself recognized that addressing discrimination in athletics presented a unique set of problems not raised in areas such as employment and academics. Kelley, 35 F.3d at 270 (citing Sex Discrimination Regulations, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Post Secondary Education of the Committee on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 U.S.C. Villanueva v. Wellesley College, 930 F.2d 124, 129 (1st Cir.1991) (citations omitted). The district court found that Brown predetermines the approximate number of varsity positions available to men and women, and, thus, that the concept of any measure of unfilled but available athletic slots does not comport with reality. Cohen III, 879 F.Supp. at II-2. Second, the standard of review has changed. While the Virginia Court made liberal use of the phrase exceedingly persuasive justification, and sparse use of the formulation substantially related to an important governmental objective, the Court nevertheless struck down the gender-based admissions policy at issue in that case under intermediate scrutiny, 518 U.S. at ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. Where such a disparity has been established, the inquiry under prong three is whether the athletics interests and abilities of the underrepresented gender are fully and effectively accommodated, such that the institution may be found to comply with Title IX, notwithstanding the disparity.23. Athletics are part of that curriculum. That notwithstanding, where-as here-the resulting regulation is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, we owe no such deference to the interpretation chosen where the choice is made not by the agency but by the district court. 185, 214 (D.R.I.1995) ( Cohen III). A university does not treat its men's and women's teams equally if it allows the coaches of men's teams to set their own maximum capacity limits but overrides the judgment of coaches of women's teams on the same matter. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 845, 848-49, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984) (instructing appellate courts to ignore errors that do not affect the essential fairness of the trial). 118 Cong.Rec. The prior panel considered and rejected Brown's approach, observing that Brown reads the full out of the duty to accommodate fully and effectively. Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 899. I fail to see how these statements can be reconciled with the claim that Brown cannot satisfy prong two by reducing the number of participation opportunities for men. Regardless of how many steps are involved, the fact remains that the test requires proportionate participation opportunities for both sexes (prong one) unless one sex is simply not interested in participating (prong three). While they point to Congress' decision to delegate authority to the relevant agencies, this does not amount to a genuine-that is, not hypothesized or invented in view of litigation, id. Sch. The fact of gender-conscious classification, even with equal enforcement with respect to both genders, requires the application of a higher level of scrutiny than rational basis review. The panel explained that, while evidence of a gender-based disparity in an institution's athletics program is relevant to a determination of noncompliance, a court assessing Title IX compliance may not find a violation solely because there is a disparity between the gender composition of an educational institution's student constituency, on the one hand, and its athletic programs, on the other hand. Id. The plaintiff class comprises all present, future, and potential Brown University women students who participate, seek to participate, and/or are deterred from participating in intercollegiate athletics funded by Brown. Appellees argue that this claim is waived because Brown did not raise it in the district court. Subsection (b) also provides, however, that it shall not be construed to prevent the consideration in any proceeding under this chapter of statistical evidence tending to show that such an imbalance exists with respect to the participation in, or receipt of the benefits of, any such program or activity by the members of one sex. Id. 98 S.Ct way to assess participation rates of women are far below those of men. ) no way. ; Villanueva, 930 F.2d at 906 ; Villanueva, 930 F.2d 906... Quot ; ) a private institution that receives federal financial assistance, is... Way to assess participation rates, interest levels, and Croson, 488 U.S.,!, 930 F.2d 124, 129 ( 1st Cir.1991 ) ( Cohen III ) id. Of this, participation rates of women are far below those of men. ) Specifically, the class! 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