In a closely watched ruling delivered on 4 September 2026, Justice Priscilla Chandra-Hanif of the High Court of Guyana refused an application by the State to have her recuse herself from the ongoing criminal proceedings in The State v Joel Gittens, Charles Scott & Glaston Henry.

Background

The case arises from a murder charge connected to events on 9 September 2020. The three accused — Joel Gittens, Charles Scott, and Glaston Henry — have been awaiting trial for over six years. The matter, originally listed in Berbice, was transferred to the Demerara criminal list and is set to be tried before a judge and jury.

Mr. C.A. Nigel Hughes and Ms. Kiswana Jefford of Hughes Fields & Stoby represent the first and third accused, Joel Gittens and Glaston Henry.

The Recusal Application

On 24 August 2026, Justice Chandra-Hanif delivered a detailed ruling granting severance — that is, ordering that certain co-accused be tried separately rather than jointly. The State contended that the reasoning in that severance ruling demonstrated apparent bias by prejudgment: specifically, that a fair-minded observer would conclude there was a real possibility the judge had already formed views on issues that should be left for a jury to decide at trial.

The State pointed to several aspects of the severance ruling, including the Court’s characterisation of certain evidence as capable of altering the jury’s assessment “in a profound way,” its treatment of disputed witness statements before a formal admissibility ruling, comments about the effectiveness of jury directions, and certain case-management decisions. The State did not allege actual bad faith or personal hostility.

The Defence’s Position

All three accused opposed the application. The defence teams argued that the severance ruling was a lawful exercise of the Court’s duty to protect the accused’s right to a fair trial. They emphasised that:

A severance application inherently requires a judge to assess the evidence and evaluate whether a joint trial would cause unfair prejudice — exactly what the Court had done.

The Court had expressly reserved all questions of admissibility, voluntariness, witness credibility, and guilt for determination at trial.

An adverse ruling, even a strongly worded one, does not amount to bias. Legal errors, if any, are properly corrected on appeal — not through recusal.

Granting recusal in these circumstances would set a troubling precedent, discouraging judges from giving full and transparent reasons on difficult pre-trial applications.

Justice Chandra-Hanif’s Decision

Justice Chandra-Hanif refused the recusal application. Applying the well-established Porter v Magill test — whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude there is a real possibility of bias — the Court found that no such conclusion was warranted.

Key aspects of the Court’s reasoning included:

The nature of the severance exercise. Deciding whether to sever a joint trial necessarily requires a provisional assessment of the evidence and its potential prejudicial effect. The State itself acknowledged this. Such provisional evaluation does not amount to a final determination of the facts.

The distinction between judge and jury. In a jury trial, the judge rules on questions of law and procedure; the jury alone determines the facts, witness credibility, and guilt. The fair-minded observer would understand this fundamental division and would not treat a judge’s pre-trial assessment of prejudice as a verdict on guilt.

Express reservations in the severance ruling. The Court had explicitly stated that it was not determining admissibility, voluntariness, truthfulness, or guilt — all of which remained for the jury.

Case-management complaints are not bias. Concerns about timetabling, listing, and the respective roles of the DPP and the Court, even if the State disagreed with how those issues were handled, do not constitute evidence of a closed mind.

Cumulative assessment. Even when considered together, the State’s various complaints did not cross the threshold from ordinary incidents of adjudication into a real possibility of bias.

The Court drew on a wide range of authorities, including leading decisions from the Caribbean Court of Justice, the Privy Council, the UK Court of Appeal, the European Court of Human Rights, and comparative jurisdictions.

Why This Decision Matters

This ruling is significant for several reasons. It reaffirms that judges have both a right and a duty to sit on cases assigned to them and should not step aside merely because a party is dissatisfied with an adverse ruling. It reinforces the principle that robust judicial reasoning — even on sensitive pre-trial issues — must not be weaponised as a basis for removing a judge. The decision also highlights the critical structural safeguard in jury trials: the jury, not the judge, is the ultimate arbiter of fact and guilt.

For the accused, who have been awaiting trial for over six years, the ruling ensures continuity and avoids further delay that would have resulted from reassigning the case.

DECISION: State v Gittens, Scott & Henry recusal FINAL judgment 4th Sept 2026